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Sector Model with Multifunctional Outputs 
GERALD WEBER 
Summary 
Studies on liberalisation normally do not take into account the ex-
ternal benefits and costs of agriculture. Empirical studies on the 
valuation of externalities should be integrated into quantitative 
modelling. MULTSIM is a national supply model of agriculture. Be-
sides commodity output the model depicts also external benefit 
linked to landscape preservation and external environmental costs 
of agriculture. Internalisation scenarios are defined showing that the 
reduction of commodity-linked support and the introduction of land 
subsidies and intermediate input taxes have differentiated impacts 
on the farm types’ competitiveness. A comprehensive policy ap-
proach to multifunctional agriculture requires market feedbacks to 
be taken into account. Internalising externalities may lead to a 
strong reduction of commodity output quantities. This gives rise to 
expectations that commodity prices would increase, which in turn 
would dampen the production impacts. As a consequence MULTSIM 
should be regarded as a bridge tool that may be linked to microeco-
nomic based multi market models and agricultural trade models. A 
further strain of model development is an improved consideration of 
multiple policy objectives. 
Key words: environmental costs; multifunctional agriculture; policy 
analysis; agricultural sector modelling 
Zusammenfassung 
Liberalisierungsstudien berücksichtigen die externen Nutzen und 
Kosten der Landwirtschaft in der Regel nicht. Empirische Studien 
zur Bewertung von Externalitäten sollten in die quantitative Model-
lierung einbezogen werden. MULTSIM ist ein nationales Angebots-
modell des Agrarsektors. Neben dem Warenoutput umfasst das Mo-
dell auch die aus der Landschaftserhaltung resultierenden externen 
Nutzen sowie die externen Umweltkosten der Landwirtschaft. Es 
werden Internalisierungsszenarien definiert, die zeigen, dass der 
Abbau von Produktsubventionen und die Einführung von Flächen-
subventionen und Vorleistungssteuern die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit 
der verschiedenen Betriebstypen ganz unterschiedlich beeinflus-
sen. Es wird auch deutlich, dass bei einem umfassenden Politik-
ansatz für eine multifunktionale Landwirtschaft auch Rückkoppe-
lungen durch die Marktmechanismen zu berücksichtigen sind. Die 
Internalisierung von Externalitäten kann zu einem starken Produk-
tionsrückgang führen. Dies lässt Produktpreissteigerungen erwar-
ten, die die Produktionseffekte abschwächen würden. Damit wird 
deutlich, dass MULTSIM als ein Bindeglied zu mikroökonomisch 
basierten Multi-Markt-Modellen und Agrarhandelsmodellen zu sehen 
ist. Eine weitere methodische Entwicklungsoption ist die verbes-
serte Berücksichtigung von Mehrfachzielsetzungen in der Politik. 
Schlüsselwörter: Umweltkosten; multifunktionale Landwirtschaft; 
Politikanalyse; Agrarsektormodellierung 
1 Introduction 
The WTO round of Doha aims at liberalising agricultural 
markets and reducing domestic support. Some countries 
demand that non-trade concerns (NTCs) are also negoti-
ated. These are policy objectives that are perceived as en-
dangered by liberalisation. NTCs overlap with the multi-
functionality concept, which means that agriculture pro-
duces non-commodity outputs like landscape amenities and 
natural environment jointly with commodity output. Since 
these outputs have characteristics of externalities and public 
goods, it is argued that farmers should not decide on factor 
allocation and output on the basis of world market prices 
only, but react to politically set incentives like subsidies 
and taxes that aim at internalising external benefits and 
costs. 
There is disagreement on the design of efficient support 
measures. The necessity of production-linked support to 
achieve national policy goals is controversially discussed. 
Big agro-exporters like the US and the Cairns Group con-
sider multifunctionality as a concept for disguised protec-
tionism. Among trade economist it is argued that NTCs do 
not justify production and trade distorting measures (e.g. 
ANDERSON, 2000; PAARLBERG, BREHDAL und LEE, 2002). 
And in fact, measuring the value of external benefits of 
agriculture is subject to considerable empirical uncertainty. 
Quantitative modelling should support policy makers in 
understanding goal conflicts. Agricultural sector models 
which depict external environmental effects focus on func-
tional relationships between production processes and envi-
ronmental indicators (e.g. for biodiversity and nitrate con-
tamination of water) as well as on economic adjustment 
processes triggered by changes in farmers’ behavioural in-
centives like prices, subsidies and taxes. They analyse the 
impacts of policy changes often at a detailed regional level 
(e.g. FLUR, GOTSCH and RIEDER, 2001; HECKELEI and 
BRITZ, 2001; MALITIUS, MACK and MORESINO, 2001). 
There exist many empirical studies valuing externalities 
from the demand side perspective. They are based on con-
tingent valuation (e.g. CICIA and SCARPA, 2002; DRAKE, 
1992; LOOMIS, 2002) and choice experiments (e.g. 
MÜLLER, 2002). However, transfers of benefits and benefit 
functions from study sites to policy sites can be subject to 
major errors (NAVRUD, 2002). This makes using the results 
of willingness-to-pay studies for policy advice and quanti-
tative modelling at the national and supranational level a 
shaky undertaking. 
Multi-market models (e.g. KIRSCHKE and JECHLITSCHKA, 
2002; WAHL, WEBER and FROHBERG, 2000) and trade 
models (e.g. DIXIT and RONINGEN, 1986; VON  LAMPE, 
2001) merge supply and demand analysis, but in most cases 
do not consider externalities or public goods/bads when 
looking at the welfare impacts of policy options. 
MULTSIM is an illustrative agricultural supply model 
differentiated by farm types. Non-commodity output is 
jointly produced with commodity output. Farm types have 
varied impacts on negative and positive externalities. Inter-
nalisation policy scenarios can be exogenously defined us-
ing subsidies and taxes linked to production factors or out-Copyright: www.gjae-online.de
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put. But it is also possible to calculate optimal values of 
internalisation variables based on prior assumptions on the 
social welfare function. MULTSIM shows impacts on farm 
income, taxpayers and overall welfare. It is designed as a 
bridge to more differentiated analysis and for later use 
linked with a standard multi-market model. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 specifies the technological and behavioural assump-
tions and describes the policy interface of MULTSIM. In 
section 3 some policy scenarios calculated with the model 
are analysed. Since the valuation of externalities and the 
functional relationships determining their production is 
subject to considerable uncertainties, section 4 presents the 
results of sensitivity analyses. In section 5 conclusions for 
policy design, on the applicability of the model for policy 
analysis and for the further development of the model are 
presented. 
2 National model of multifunctional agriculture 
2.1 Technology 
The agricultural sector produces the following outputs: 
commodity output y represented by the production value, 
non-commodity output a with external benefits from land-
scape maintenance (e.g. flood control, aesthetic value, vari-
ety of landscape, amenities), and environmental output e 
representing external costs (e.g. water, soil and air contami-
nation). Production takes place in five farm types. These are 
specialised field crops, specialised grazing, specialised 
granivore, permanent cultures, and mixed agricultural pro-
duction [F=(FIELD,GRAZ,GRAN,PERM,MIX)]. As pro-
duction factors producers use intermediate input, land and 
other primary factors including labour and capital 
[L=(INT,LAND,OTHP)]. 
Non-allocable inputs and complementary output are 
sources of jointness between commodity output and non-
commodity output (OECD, 2001, p. 30), but the model al-
lows for variable proportions between these joint products. 
Commodity production function 
For each farm type a production function YF relates 
commodity output yf to input use xf: 
(1) ()    all for    YF ∏ = ≤
l
fl f f f f
fl xf a yf
α xf  
∑ = > ∈ ∈
l
1    ;   0   ,    ;    ;    fl fl f a L l F f α α .  
Total agricultural output is then defined by: 
(2)  ∑ =
f
f yf y . 
The production factors of a farm type are strictly essential 
in (1), whereas the single farm types are not strictly essen-
tial in (2). The technology is characterised by constant re-
turns to scale, and the production functions are factor-wise 
separable with substitution elasticities equal to unity. The 
inherent assumptions of the Cobb-Douglas technology are 
restrictive, but reduce the number of parameters to be esti-
mated. 
Landscape benefit production function 
Contrary to the commodity production function it is as-
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1    ; 0    ; 0 , b    ; f f f f F f γ β γ β . 
The above function relates landscape benefit to land use 
and commodity output per land unit, whereby land is as-
sumed non-allocable to commodity output and landscape 
benefit. The marginal productivity of land also depends on 
commodity output. If the elasticities γf are positive, land-
scape benefit and commodity output are complementary. 
Substituting (1) into the above function yields the fol-
lowing production function for landscape benefit: 
(3)  () ∏ = =
f
INT f f
f INT f f xf a b a
γ α γ ,






f OTHP f LAND f f f
OTHP f LAND f xf xf
γ α α γ β − −  
( ) ∑ = + ≥ > ∈
f
1    ; 0    ; 0 , b    ; f f f f F f γ β γ β . 
(3) shows positive marginal productivities of land for 
βn>γn(1-αn,LAND), i.e. for small γ-parameters relative to β-pa-
rameters. For βn<1+γn(1-αn,LAND) positive marginal produc-
tivity of land diminishes with increasing land use and for 
βn>γn(1-αn,LAND) it increases with increasing use of the other 
production factors. If βn<γn(1-αn,LAND), i.e. for relatively 
large γ-parameters, commodity output per land unit has a 
strong influence on landscape benefit and hence marginal 
productivity of land might be negative. 
Environmental costs production function 
The potential environmental costs per land unit sef in the 
farm types depend on intermediate input use per land unit: 
()   1    ; 0 c    ;    all for    SEF f
,



















Land is a sink-resource for toxic chemicals from interme-
diate input use. Increasing intermediate input use degrades 
soil and reduces the sink quality of land so that the potential 
environmental burden increases disproportionately. To cal-
culate potential environmental costs ef caused by the farm 
types the above function is multiplied with land input by 
farm type, which yields: 
(4)  ()
f f
LAND f INT f f f f xf xf c xf ef
κ κ − = =
1
, , EF  
1     ;   0 c    ;    all for  f > > ∈ f F f κ . 
In the above function marginal environmental costs of 
intermediate input use is positive, increasing in intermedi-
ate input use and decreasing in land use. It also follows that 
marginal environmental costs of land is negative, increasing 
in land use and decreasing in intermediate input use. 
Finally, the potential environmental costs at the farm type 
level is aggregated to total sector environmental costs: Copyright: www.gjae-online.de
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f ef . 
Depending on the parameter ν in (5) land of farm types 
with low environmental burden may serve as ecological 
compensation for farm types causing high environmental 
burden. With ν=0 there would be no such ecological dilu-
tion effect, whereas with ν=1 total sector environmental 
costs would equal average potential environmental costs per 
land unit over all farm types times constant factor d. 
2.2 Allocation of production factors 
Profit is defined as the sum of rents accruing to the farm 
sector from fixed production factors. In the scenarios and 
sensitivity analyses presented in sections 3 and 4 it is as-
sumed that the land capacity (LAND) is given at the total 
sector level and that other primary factor input (OTHP) is 
fixed at the farm type level. Variable factors are intermedi-
ate input (INT) and land at the farm type level. Given prices 
and subsidies/taxes for commodity output (pp and sp) and 
production factors (pw  and  sw), the single farm types 
maximise their profits subject to production function (1): 
(6)  ( ) ( ) ∑ + − + =
l
fl fl fl f f f f sw pw xf sp pp yf PF : max!
L l F f ∈ ∈    ;    all for    . 
Land rent is maximised at the total sector level given 
prices for land use: 
(7)  F f pw xf R
f
LAND f LAND f ∈ = ∑     ; : max! , , . 
Two further constraints balance the land transfers xftran 
between farm types with area allocation of the base year 
AREAF and total sector land capacity AREA: 
(8)   , ∑∑ − + ≤
nm
mn nm m LAND m xftran xftran AREAF xf
0    ; m n,   m;   all for    ≥ ∈ nm xftran F . 
and 
(9)  F AREA xf
m
LAND m ∈ ≤ ∑ m    ; , . 
The optimisation problems at farm type level and at total 
sector level are set up simultaneously. A system of Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for non-linear optimisation with inequal-
ity constraints is programmed with the software GAMS 
(BROOKE et al., 1998). It comprises marginal conditions, 
non-negativity restrictions and complementary slackness 
equalities (i) at the farm type level for each of the decision 
variables yf and xf and the multipliers λ of the commodity 
production functions and (ii) at the total sector level for 
each of the decision variables xfm,LAND, the multipliers u of 
the land transfer constraints and the multiplier t of the land 
capacity constraint. The solution contains the profit and 
land rent maximising factor inputs by farm type xf
*, land 
transfers  xftran
*, commodity output yf
*, and the shadow 
price t
* for the land capacity. The production functions (2) 
and (3) determine landscape benefits a and environmental 
costs  e. The system can be solved, however, only if the 
multipliers u are known
1).  
2.3 Data and model calibration 
The model frame is filled with production and input value 
data of the German Farm Accountancy Data Network for 
the base year 1999/2000 (BMVEL, 2001). These data are 
made consistent with the Economic Accounts for Agricul-
ture (EUROSTAT, 2000) at the total sector level. 
Data for external landscape benefits and environmental 
costs are more uncertain. There is great variance in the re-
sults of willingness-to-pay studies for landscape amenities 
depending on the methodological design, attributes cov-
ered, site characteristics and socio-economic environment 
(e.g. CICIA and SCARPA, 2002; LOOMIS, 2002; BROUWER 
and SLANGEN, 1998). The calculations presented in section 
3 are based on agricultural landscape benefit corresponding 
to 5 % of the commodity output value. But also the envi-
ronmental costs are assumed to be relatively high amount-
ing to 10 % of the commodity output value. It is to be noted 
that these values are not meant to reflect true external bene-
fits and costs but are set for illustrative scenario building. 
Sensitivity analyses with respect to the valuation of the ex-
ternalities are presented in section 4.1. 
The complete elasticity set for the base version of 
MULTSIM is presented in table 1. The production elastic-
ities in the commodity output production functions are es-
timated as input value shares in commodity output value. 
This implies that factor wages reflect marginal value pro-
ductivities of production factors. It is assumed that the ag-
gregate elasticity of landscape benefit with respect to land 
is unity (Σfβf=1), whereas commodity output has no direct 
influence on landscape benefit (γf=0). The landscape bene-
fit elasticities of the single farm types reflect shares in total 
agricultural land use. The environmental costs elasticities 
with respect to intermediate input are set to κf=1.5. There is 
no ecological dilution effect taken into account (ν=0). Sen-
sitivity analyses with respect to landscape benefit elastic-
ities are presented in section 4.2. 
Table 1: Production elasticities in the base version 
(BAS) 
   FIELD  GRAZ  GRAN  PERM  MIX 
αααα   INTINP  0.591 0.567 0.778 0.294 0.788 
  LANDINP  0.121 0.090 0.062 0.048 0.088 
β    0.527 0.374 0.033 0.009 0.057 
γ    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
κ    1.500 1.500 1.500 1.500 1.500 
The constant factors of the production functions are cali-
brated in order to exactly reproduce the data for the base 
year. Also the multipliers u of the land transfer constraints 
are calibrated. The calibration procedure of MULTSIM as-
sumes that the statistically observed factor inputs are also 
profit maximising inputs. Given prices, subsidies and taxes 
and all inputs fixed for the base year the Kuhn-Tucker sys-
tem can be solved for the multiplier t of the land capacity 
constraint and multipliers u of the land transfer constraints. 
                                                                        
1) The mathematical foundations of Kuhn-Tucker systems are explained 
for example in CHIANG (1984, pp. 722). Copyright: www.gjae-online.de
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These two multipliers determine the prices for land use in 
the single farm types and ensure that land demand in the 
calibrated model exactly corresponds to land distribution in 
the base year. In the model simulations the calibrated val-
ues for u are kept unchanged. 
2.4 Policy interface 
The policy interface of the model comprises a spreadsheet 
to set subsidies and taxes linked to output and production 
factors, the calculation of welfare and distributional indi-
cators and an optional optimisation procedure to determine 
values for subsidies and taxes based on prior assumption on 
the social welfare function. 
The welfare and distributional indicators are the producer 
rents, the external benefits and costs and the taxpayers’ net 
position vis-à-vis agriculture which is defined as expendi-
tures on subsidies minus revenues from taxes. The con-
sumer rent is not calculated since MULTSIM assumes that 
demand for commodity output is perfectly price elastic. 
Only after completing the model by price dependent de-
mand functions the consumer rent may be computed. Over-
all social welfare is defined as the sum of the above indi-
cators. Hence, in the overall social welfare function com-
modity output and factor inputs are valued at their prices 
net of subsidies and taxes but with external benefit and 
costs taken into account. 
The existence of externalities makes it unlikely that profit 
maximising behaviour of farmers results in social welfare 
maximising factor input unless government intervention 
corrects the price signals of the markets (PEARCE und 
TURNER, 1990, pp. 84). Government intervention in the 
form of subsidies and taxes can be played through with the 
model by scenario analyses. The impacts on overall social 
welfare and single welfare indicators can be compared. A 
more normative procedure is to maximise overall social 
welfare or single welfare indicators or a vector of such in-
dicators and to determine the corresponding allocation of 
production factors subject to the technological constraints. 
The task is then to find those values for subsidies and taxes 
that lead to that optimal allocation conditioned on profit 
maximising behaviour of farmers. Such normative policy 
analyses can be conducted if policy preferences are known. 
A disadvantage of the normative procedure is that policy 
preferences often become visible only after having dis-
cussed several policy options with their results. This in 
mind, it is in most cases more helpful to first analyse sev-
eral alternative policy options with different levels of sub-
sidies and taxes by conventional scenario setting. But addi-
tional normative analyses offer advantages: they create sce-
narios that serve as additional references with which policy 
options can be compared. In order to find “good” policy 
options it is important to have calculated scenarios that are 
already “optimal” at least with respect to one or several in-
dicators. 
Normative analyses in the above sense is therefore pro-
posed by MULTSIM. The model is solved for the social 
welfare maximising subsidies and taxes conditioned on 
farmers that behave as profit maximising producers. The 
modelling-technique uses the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for 
profit maximisation as constraints to the social welfare op-
timisation problem. 
3 Internalisation scenarios 
3.1 Policy assumptions 
In the base scenario (BA) all commodity subsidies are 
abolished. Policy instruments for internalising external 
costs and benefits are intermediate input taxes and land 
subsidies. These policy instruments are at their social wel-
fare maximising levels in scenario 4 (SC4). In SC1 to SC3 
and SC 5 to SC 7 intermediate input taxes are reduced and 
increased, respectively, by identical steps of 25 % of their 
levels in SC4. As in BA commodity subsidies are abolished 
throughout SC1 to SC7. 
To determine the subsidies and taxes for SC4 a two-step 
optimisation procedure is run. The first step maximises 
overall social welfare subject to the technological and 
farmers’ behavioural constraints as described in section 2. 
The second step minimises the taxpayers’ net position
2) 
subject to the same constraints but, in addition, with the re-
sult for overall social welfare from the first step fixed. 
3.2 Results 
Subsidies and taxes in the base year (BY) and in the differ-
ent scenarios are presented in Table 2. In the full internali-
sation scenario (SC4) land subsidies for the farm types 
range from €103 to €191 per ha and intermediate input 
taxes cover 15.2 % to 17.4 % of the purchase prices. The 
highest land subsidies but also the lowest intermediate input 
taxes are calculated for mixed (MIX) and specialised 
granivore (GRAN) farm types. 
Table 2: Subsidies and taxes in base year, base 
scenario and internalisation scenarios 
  BY  BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC6 SC7 
Commodity subsidies
1 
FIELD  12.5  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
GRAZ  7.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
GRAN  6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
PERM  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
MIX  10.3  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Intermediate input taxes
2  
FIELD  0.0 0.0 4.3 8.5  12.8  17.1  21.4  25.6  29.9 
GRAZ  0.0 0.0 4.0 8.1  12.1  16.2  20.2  24.3  28.3 
GRAN  0.0 0.0 3.8 7.6  11.4  15.2  19.0  22.9  26.7 
PERM  0.0 0.0 4.4 8.7  13.1  17.4  21.8  26.1  30.5 
MIX  0.0 0.0 3.6 7.3  10.9  14.6  18.2  21.8  25.5 
Land subsidies
3  
FIELD  0  0  107 107 107 107 107 107 107 
GRAZ  0  0  103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
GRAN  0  0  191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
PERM  0  0  150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
MIX  0  0  155 155 155 155 155 155 155 
1 In % of commodity price. – 2  In % of purchase price. – 3  In € per ha 
Table 3 shows the impacts on intermediate input use, land 
use and commodity output. Abolishing commodity subsi-
dies in the base scenario (BA) leads to a substantial fall in 
intermediate input use by 23  % for the total agricultural 
sector. The strongest reduction is calculated for the mixed 
                                                                        
2) The sum of the squared net transfers (subsidies minus taxes) of the 
taxpayers to the farm types is minimised. Copyright: www.gjae-online.de
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farm type for two reason: first, the commodity subsidies of 
the base year are very high in this farm type so that abol-
ishing means a strong decline in the incentive price, and, 
second, the share of intermediate input in the production 
value is the highest among all farm types. With full inter-
nalisation of the external effects by land subsidies and in-
termediate input taxes (SC4) intermediate input use of the 
total sector is reduced by 48 %, again with the strongest 
impact for the mixed farm type. 
When commodity subsidies are abolished (BA), the ex-
ternal environmental costs fall by €1.1 billion (see figure). 
With full internalisation (SC4) the environmental situation 
is improved by further €1.1 billion. The total effect of SC4 
on environmental costs is a reduction of 63 % compared to 
the base year (BY). The external landscape benefits vary 
only slightly between the different scenarios. With total 
sector land capacity used at its limit the only potential 
source for increasing landscape benefit is reallocation of 
land between the different farm types. 
The welfare position of producers and taxpayers and the 
external benefits and costs in the base year and the different 
scenarios are also shown in the figure. Abolishing com-
modity subsidies (BA) reduces the taxpayers’ burden by 
€3.3 billion. The loss in producer rents amounts to €3.0 bil-
lion or 23 %. With full internalisation of externalities (SC4) 
there is a further reduction of producer rents by 5 % com-
pared to BA, since land subsides are not sufficiently high to 
compensate farmers for losses from intermediate input 
taxes. The taxpayers’ net position improves slightly thanks 
to the revenues from intermediate input taxes which are 
slightly higher than the expenditures for land subsidies. 
Table 3: Impacts on commodity output and factor input 
in base scenario and internalisation scenarios 
(percentage change over base year) 
  BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC6 SC7 
Commodity output 
Total  sector  -14 -19 -24 -28 -32 -36 -39 -42 
FIELD  -17 -22 -27 -31 -34 -38 -41 -43 
GRAZ  -7 -12 -16 -20 -23 -26 -29 -32 
GRAN  -24 -27 -38 -46 -54 -60 -65 -69 
PERM  1  0 -2 -3 -5 -6 -7 -9 
MIX  -41 -41 -50 -57 -64 -69 -73 -77 
Intermediate input 
Total  sector  -23 -30 -37 -43 -48 -53 -57 -61 
FIELD  -26 -34 -40 -45 -50 -54 -58 -61 
GRAZ  -13 -22 -28 -34 -39 -43 -47 -51 
GRAN  -29 -34 -46 -55 -62 -68 -73 -77 
PERM  1  -4 -10 -14 -19 -23 -27 -30 
MIX  -47 -48 -58 -65 -71 -76 -80 -83 
Land use 
Total  sector  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FIELD  -5 -7 -7 -7 -6 -6 -6 -6 
GRAZ  13  9 11 12 14 15 17 18 
GRAN  -17  16  4  -6 -15 -24 -31 -37 
PERM  13 28 30 31 32 33 34 35 
MIX  -33  -6 -14 -22 -29 -35 -40 -45 
Overall social welfare improves by €2 billion when SC4 
is compared to BY, whereby two thirds of that gain result 
from abolishing commodity subsidies and only one third 
from the introduction of the internalisation policy instru-
ments. 
4 Sensitivity analysis 
There is considerable uncertainty about the value of exter-
nal benefits and costs and on the production relationships in 
a multifunctional agriculture. The sensitivity analyses ex-
amine the consequences of different assumptions on the 
valuation of externalities and on the magnitude of land-
scape benefit elasticities. 
4.1 Valuation of externalities 
In model version V1 the base year’s external environmental 
costs is only half of the value as assumed for the model’s 
base version (BAS) that was used for the scenarios in sec-
tion 3. In model version V2 the base year’s external land-
scape benefit is twice as high as in BAS. 
Table 4 shows the land subsidies and intermediate input 
taxes in the full internalisation scenario (SC4) for all three 
model versions. With halved environmental costs (V1) in-
termediate input taxes are about one third lower than in 
BAS and also the land subsidies are one-third lower. The 
parallelism in the impact on the two internalisation instru-
ments is a direct consequence of the second objective crite-
rion, i.e. the minimisation of the taxpayers’ net position 
(see section 3.1). Doubling landscape benefit (V2) has only 
minor consequences on the optimal level of the internalisa-
tion instruments. 
Together with the finding that the social welfare function 
is rather flat within a range of ± 50 % of the optimal level of 
the intermediate input tax (SC2 to SC6) (see figure), the 
results of the sensitivity analyses cautiously suggest that the 
choice of the level of the internalisation instruments may be 
rather robust to different estimates of the value of external-
ities when overall social welfare is the dominant criterion. 
Table 4: Sensitivity of optimal subsidies and taxes to 
valuation of externalities (percentage change 




Intermediate input taxes 
FIELD -30.3  -0.2 
GRAZ -35.0  0.3 
GRAN -30.6  -1.1 
PERM -33.8  1.9 
MIX -29.5  -2.6 
Land subsidies 
FIELD -35.2  1.9 
GRAZ -38.2  -3.1 
GRAN -31.0  2.5 
PERM -37.8  -8.3 
MIX -30.1  4.2 
1 External environmental costs in base year 50 % lower than in BAS. – 
2 External 
landscape benefit in base year 100 % higher than in BAS.  
4.2 Elasticities in the landscape benefit function 
β-elasticities 
In model version BET the elasticities in the landscape bene-
fit function with respect to land, the β-elasticities, represent 
a higher influence of specialised grazing (GRAZ) and Copyright: www.gjae-online.de
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mixed (MIX) farm types than those in model version BAS. 
In order to safeguard the homogeneity of degree 1 of the 
landscape benefit function, the β-elasticities of the other 
farm types have lower values than in BAS. The elasticities 
in the different model versions are shown in table 5. 
Table 5: Landscape benefit elasticities in different model 
version 
  FIELD GRAZ GRAN PERM  MIX 
BAS 
β  0.527 0.374 0.033 0.009 0.057 
γ  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BET 
β  0.354 0.503 0.022 0.006 0.115 
γ  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GAM 
β  0.395 0.281 0.025 0.007 0.043 
γ  0.104 0.098 0.021 0.010 0.017 
For the full internalisation scenario (SC4) the results of 
the sensitivity analyses with respect to optimal land subsi-
dies are presented in table 6. With a stronger dependence of 
landscape benefit on land use in specialised grazing and 
mixed farm types land subsidies for these farm types are 
13.1  % and 17.5  %, respectively, higher than in BAS, 
whereas they are 5.8 % to 9.3 % lower for the other farm 
types. In model version BET full internalisation of exter-
nalities leads to an increase of land use in the mixed farm 
type by 15 %, whereas in BAS land use in this farm type is 
reduced. The stronger differentiation in farm types’ land 
use impacts strengthens the potential of land reallocation 
for improving landscape benefits: whereas for model ver-
sion BAS landscape benefit was slightly reduced in the full 
internalisation scenario (see figure), it increases by 5 % for 
model version BET. The impacts of different assumptions 
about the elasticity values on intermediate input taxes are 
also presented in table 6. For the mixed farm type the opti-
mal tax level in model version BET is about 10 % lower 
than in BAS, whereas for other farm types small increases 
are calculated. 
Table 6: Sensitivity of optimal subsidies and taxes to 
landscape benefit elasticities (percentage 
change over the base model BAS) 
 BET  GAM 
Intermediate input taxes   FIELD 0.0  -9.8 
   GRAZ  2.6  -9.0 
 GRAN  3.8  -10.1 
 PERM  1.5  -3.4 
 MIX  -10.2  -15.2 
Land subsidies FIELD  -9.3  -7.5 
 GRAZ  13.1  -6.0 
 GRAN  -5.8  -17.0 
 PERM  -8.5  -27.5 
 MIX  17.5  -13.9 
γ–elasticities 
In a second set of sensitivity analyses it is assumed that 
landscape benefit does not depend on land use only but on 
commodity output, too. The model version GAM represents 
an aggregate landscape benefit elasticity with respect to 
commodity output of 0.25. This value is distributed to farm 
types according to their shares in commodity output value. 
Welfare indicators in the base year and scenarios (in billion €) 
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Producer surplus  13.143  10.104  11.306  10.680  10.114  9.602  9.135  8.709  8.317 
Taxpayer  -3.308  -1.252  -0.713  -0.280  0.069  0.350  0.577  0.760 
Landscape benefit  1.760  1.745  1.753  1.752  1.749  1.745  1.740  1.734  1.727 
Environmental costs  -3.519  -2.396  -2.045  -1.752  -1.512  -1.313  -1.147  -1.008  -0.890 
Overall social welfare  8.075  9.453  9.763  9.967  10.072  10.103  10.078  10.012  9.915 
BY  BA  SC1  SC2  SC3  SC4  SC5  SC6  SC7 
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The farm type specific elasticities with respect to commod-
ity output, the γ–elasticities, are shown in table 5. In order 
to safeguard the homogeneity of degree 1 of the landscape 
benefit function the β-elasticities are smaller than in BAS. 
In model version GAM optimal land subsidies are 6 % to 
27.5  % lower and optimal intermediate input taxes are 
3.4 % to 15.2 % lower than in BAS (see table 6). Again, the 
parallelism in the impact on the internalisation instruments 
is a direct consequence of the second objective criterion, 
i.e. the minimisation of the taxpayers’ net position. 
If landscape benefit depends on commodity output, there 
is a trade-off between reducing environmental costs and 
improving landscape benefits. The reduction of environ-
mental costs due to full internalisation is smaller in model 
GAM than in model version BAS. But also the decline in 
landscape benefit is in GAM higher than in BAS. 
5 Conclusions 
5.1 National and international policy design 
The implementation of policy measures often depends on 
the possibility to compensate for losses of certain social 
groups. Therefore a single welfare criterion is not sufficient 
to discriminate between policy options that aim at internal-
ising external costs of agriculture and improving its multi-
functional value. 
The policy simulations show that abolishing commodity 
subsidies results in strong income losses for farmers of 
about 23  %. These losses could be avoided if taxpayers’ 
transfers to agriculture would be redirected into direct pay-
ments that are decoupled from output and factor input. This 
is possible without additional burden on the taxpayer’s net 
position. The net external costs of agriculture (environ-
mental costs minus landscape benefit) would be substan-
tially reduced so that there is a gain in overall social wel-
fare. 
Full internalisation of externalities by intermediate input 
taxes and land subsidies leads to an additional reduction of 
agriculture’s net external costs that is higher than the addi-
tional loss in producer rents. The land subsidies do not fully 
compensate farmers for the income losses from the inter-
mediate input taxes if minimisation of the taxpayers’ net 
position is a secondary policy objective. Nearly full income 
compensation by additional decoupled payments to the 
farm sector could be granted within the limits of the tax-
payers’ net payments of the base year. However, this de-
pends on the size of the environmental costs to be internal-
ised. Additional sensitivity analysis with the same model 
shows that for very high external environmental costs 
(20 % of commodity output value) farm income compensa-
tion in the full internalisation scenario would need addi-
tional financial resources. 
The modelling results also indicate that the policy objec-
tives for a multifunctional agriculture must not necessarily 
result in conflicts with international trade policy. If a com-
bination of different policy measures that aims at internal-
ising positive as well as negative external effects of agri-
culture is implemented, the impact on commodity output 
quantity is unlikely to be positive. The Uruguay round of 
the GATT has made substantial improvements in catego-
rizing agricultural support measures into allowed non pro-
duction distorting and forbidden production distorting ef-
fects. Such a categorization, as helpful as it is for guidance 
in international agricultural policy, bears also the danger, 
that the choice for national agricultural policy-making is 
too heavily restricted. What is necessary in addition to the 
categorization of the policy measures, is an integrated 
valuation of the combined effects of policy measures im-
plemented in a country. This should allow, for example, to 
exempt subsidies linked to land use from the obligation to 
abolish domestic support, if the country also employs 
measures to internalise external environmental costs that at 
the same time also reduce commodity output. 
5.2 Applicability of the model 
At the national and supranational level the framework for 
the design of national policies is set. At these policy sites 
goal conflicts between farm incomes, environment, multi-
functionality, more market orientation and international 
trade are visible. The model MULTSIM can serve to bridge 
more detailed analyses of multifunctional and agro-envi-
ronmental issues and market and trade analysis. The model 
does not allow to draw conclusion for specific policy design 
at the regional level. It therefore does not compete with re-
gionally disaggregated models. 
There is great uncertainty in measuring willingness-to-
pay for environment and landscape benefit at the policy site 
(NAVRUD, 2002; RANDALL, 2002). In such a situation an 
economic model like MULTSIM that postulates relatively 
simple functional relationships between factor input, com-
modity output and externalities may be helpful. With data 
and parameter sensitivity analyses the potential impacts of 
alternative hypotheses on the functional relationships on 
optimal policy design can be tested. This just reflects the 
true world of policy-making which is characterised by un-
certain knowledge about these relationships. 
With MULTSIM the supply effects of environmental and 
multifunctional policy measures are modelled, but price 
feedbacks from markets on factor allocation and hence on 
external benefit and costs are not yet taken into account. If 
the supply effects in a country or a group of countries with 
similar policy objectives influence world market prices, the 
welfare indicators calculated by MULTSIM may be incom-
plete. The same counts for the case that domestically pro-
duced and imported goods are imperfect substitutes. Market 
and trade models that depict such market linkages normally 
do not consider impacts on externalities and public goods. 
For these reasons MULTSIM should be linked to a multi-
market model or an agricultural trade model. This would 
allow to better represent the interactions between market 
and trade policy and environmental and multifunctionality 
policies. Cost-benefit analysis based on quantitative model-
ling could be improved. Good candidates for such a linkage 
are microeconomic multi-market models that are compati-
ble with the behavioural assumptions in MULTSIM (e.g. 
WAHL, WEBER and FROHBERG, 2000). 
Multifunctional agriculture has many policy objectives 
that compete with each other. Models for policy decision 
support should make visible goal conflicts but should also 
support the finding of solutions. However, there are draw-
backs in normative policy analysis which are not easily to 
overcome. One of them is a-priori weighting of different 
objective criteria to arrive at one overall social welfare in-
dicator, which bears the danger that important policy op-Copyright: www.gjae-online.de
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tions may be ignored. The use of more flexible optimisation 
approaches for multiple policy goals like reference point 
optimisation (WIERZBICKI, 2000) should be tested. 
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